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DISCUSSION OF IMPROVING BANKRUPTCY
PROCEDURE BY PHILIPPE AGHION, OLIVER
HART, AND JOHN MOORE
PHILIP H. DYBVIG*
By bringing together a wide range of bankruptcy scholars and practition-
ers, this Conference has made very clear the broad extent of opinions about
current bankruptcy law. One extreme view suggests bankruptcy is a
mysterious and wonderful process that has many benefits that are difficult
or impossible to quantify or enumerate. A polar extreme view, presented
in the paper I am discussing by Aghion, Hart, and Moore (AHM),' is that
bankruptcy is a complicated and costly solution to a very simple problem.2
I suspect the truth (or at least the most useful view of the world) lies
between the two extremes. It certainly should be possible to quantify and
enumerate the functions of the bankruptcy process, and the resulting
demystification should be an input to improved policy decisions. On the
other side, the existing proposed simple alternatives to bankruptcy, such as
that of AHM, neglect important functions of bankruptcy. The AHM paper
in particular weakens its own case by neglecting existing institutions.
Perhaps because of our shared economic training, I am predisposed to be
sympathetic with the central motivation of AHM. For example, I have a
casual perception that Chapter 11 works poorly for large firms. Based on
what I know about large publicized bankruptcies, the bankruptcy process
is unnecessarily slow, arbitrary, manipulable, and destructive of prior
contracting. Unfortunately, the hard evidence I am aware of neither
confirms nor refutes my perception To the extent that my perception is
* Boatmen's Bancshares Professor of Banking and Finance, Olin School of Business,
Washington University in Saint Louis.
1. Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994).
2. The paper I am discussing is a slightly different exposition of the plan proposed in Philippe
Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy
, 
Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 523 (1992).
3. For example, the analysis of Professor Bowers, see James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation,
Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 955 (1994), is clearly flawed because a large fall in stock price on announcement of bankruptcy
would be expected due to the bad news about firm fundamentals implicit in the announcement. This
price reduction would occur whether the bankruptcy process is value-neutral, value-destroying, or
somewhat value-enhancing. Accordingly, the fall in stock price is no evidence at all concerning the
value impact of bankruptcy. Adverse selection on later sale is conditioned on information available at
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accurate, each of the shortcomings of the bankruptcy process causes
avoidable economic damage, the cost of which must be borne by somebody
and is a dead-weight loss to society as a whole.
If the costs of the existing process are indeed large, there should be an
advantage in changing the bankruptcy system from the current process
towards a more mechanical contract-based process that will avoid these
costs, and AHM proposes such a contracting structure. Their contracting
solution is unavailable now because it is hard or impossible for firms to
agree ex ante not to enter bankruptcy. Furthermore, making the contract-
based solution the default rule would eliminate the need for firms to expend
resources writing the necessary contracts themselves. Unfortunately, as I
discuss below, AHM does not contain an adequate argument in favor of the
proposed scheme, and minimally, a number of details of the scheme need
to be resolved.
The starting point of AHM is a list of desiderata for bankruptcy schemes.
I would have much preferred an analysis from first principles, which is
admittedly absent,4 because it would have helped to isolate the assumptions
underlying these desiderata. Short of that, it is useful to remember that it
is intended to be implicit in each of the desiderata that ex ante economic
efficiency is the ultimate goal. It is not obvious that the AIIM scheme
satisfies the desiderata outside the simple framework in which they are
implicitly applied. For example, if ex post efficiency (desideratum 1) takes
into account externalities in the community and the welfare of current and
potential tort claimants, the AHM scheme seems much less attractive than
it does in the case of a simple textbook firm bankruptcy with only financial
claimants.
I also have a particular quibble with desideratum 3, which says
bankruptcy should preserve absolute priority.' It seems useful to have
bankruptcy produce a predictable outcome to facilitate contracting (although
we know randomization can in principle be useful in contracting), but it is
unclear that this predictable outcome must necessarily be the one from
optimal liquidation choice under absolute priority. Perhaps more important-
the time of the sale (including the announcement). Thus, the stock price fall on announcement does
not counter the underpricing argument. I am not, however, claiming that the conclusion reached by
Bowers, see id., is wrong. Instead, I am pointing out that the logic of the argument is incorrect (and
not in conformance with the standards applied to such interpretation by the finance profession), and
should not be taken as evidence in one direction or the other.
4. Aghion et al., supra note 1, at 851.
5. Id. at 852.
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ly, absolute priority is hard to define for large public companies with large
numbers of claimants, which include not only a potpourri of financial
claimants, but also various tort claimants, employee, supplier, and customer
contracts, pension liabilities, and environmental obligations.6 It indeed
may be optimal to exclude nonfinancial claimants from the bankruptcy
process, but that is an assumption of AHM, not a conclusion.7 It is
doubtful that the administrative procedure for determining absolute priority
will be any simpler than the current process, which actually follows a
variant of desideratum 4: i.e., let the claimants decide. Another possible
alternative to preservation of absolute priority is to allocate to claimants in
liquidation amounts that approximate the values they would receive in
continuation of the business. This would help to ensure productive
efficiency by minimizing the conflict about whether to liquidate.
A particular weakness of AHM is in the examples that are intended to
illustrate the deficiencies of existing law. These examples do not seem to
be consistent with actual law, and at a minimum, they are incompletely
specified. Example A is supposed to be a situation in which current
institutions will perform an economically unjustified liquidation of the
firm.8 Senior creditors are owed $100, and in six months the firm will be
worth either $40 or $180. The current liquidation value is $110, which is
less than the firm value on continuation of $120. The example is not very
explicit (about why the firm is in bankruptcy or about the claim of junior
debt, which I take for convenience to be zero9), but there does not seem
to be a real problem. If the senior debtors are owed their $100 payable six
months from now (or later), then management can propose a plan that
maintains this promise. Under the definition of bankruptcy law, they have
an unimpaired claim, and are presumed to vote for the plan, which is
approved since equity (the other class) votes for it. (Any junior debtors
6. I have tried to limit the list in the text to formal legal commitments, but we also could add
other externalities such as the "effect on the community." Arguments about whether such concerns
should be included in the bankruptcy process seem to be based more on political beliefs than on hard
analysis or evidence. For people who believe that government can and should help alleviate the
problems of its disadvantaged citizenry, it is obvious that community concerns should be included in
the analysis. The opposite is equally obvious for people who tend to think that government
involvement generally does more harm than good and, therefore, that government should limit itself to
minimal functions of enforcing contracts and defense.
7. There is actually a bit of ambiguity in the AHM paper on this point. We could alternatively
interpret the paper as saying that it is easy to adapt the AHM process for other types of claims not
explicitly included in the model. It does not sound easy to me.
8. Aghion et al., supra note 1, at 859.
9. If there is a junior debt claim, the analysis is slightly messier but the conclusion is unchanged.
1994]
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could be induced to vote for the plan, too.) Interestingly, the presumption
of an affirmative vote by the unimpaired claimants is a feature of extant
law that already addresses some of the concerns of AHM.'
Alternatively, if the $100 is due now, management can use the period of
exclusivity to stall a decision on a plan until after the debt is due. Or,
management could use debtor-in-possession financing to raise $100
(through the issuance of junk bonds) to pay off the senior creditors' claim.
There are many ways in which the current institution can be used to avoid
the inefficiency. Although I have not shown that this outcome will occur
(because that depends on details not included in the example and a specific
model of decisionmaking), it is clear that the description by AHM is
inconsistent with current institutions.
Example B' is also problematic. I agree that the outcome would
probably not be liquidation with payment according to strict priority, but
it is not obvious that the likely outcome (liquidation with payment on a
different schedule) is any worse, a priori. To be more specific, we require
a fundamental analysis with an explicit model respecting the institutions.
By the way, I assume the reference to the "Coase Theorem" was in
response to someone's criticism, since I am sure the authors know that the
Coase Theorem is not valid when there is asymmetric information (which
exists in most real situations, and especially in bankruptcy).
Is the procedure in the paper really consistent with bankruptcies of
individuals and small firms? One attractive strand of the paper is the
distinction between ownership and control, and the idea that a firm can
survive even if management and the current ownership are left out.
However, these notions clearly do not make sense for individuals or small
companies. Rehabilitation is also a motive special to individuals (or
perhaps small firms). Presumably, like restrictions on indentured servitude,
rehabilitation helps to keep individuals from inflicting too much damage on
themselves by entering bad contracts.' This is not strictly speaking an
economic argument, since economic agents never make mistakes!
Nonetheless, it might be one reason why individuals should be treated
differently from large companies. It also seems that a typical individual
bankruptcy would involve only a handful of claimants and that bankruptcy
court would serve primarily as a threat point in negotiations among the
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1988).
11. Aghion et al., supra note 1, at 859.
12. Obviously, this scheme raises a political question: should individuals be free to make their own
mistakes? Protection after the fact destroys some freedom to make a commitment before the fact.
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individual and the claimants. These characteristics are not found in a big
corporate bankruptcy.
There are some practical questions regarding the conversion of debt
claims to equity. Many bondholders hold bonds because they do not want
equities, perhaps because they are not legally allowed to hold them.'3 The
time of bankruptcy is perhaps the time when both information asymmetries
and risk are greatest. For somebody who wanted to hold bonds in a safer
firm before bankruptcy, this is a very bad time to either sell or hold the
new equity. Because of the information asymmetry, selling will be at a
large discount, and because of the high risk, holding will be very
unattractive. Also, debtholders often do not want to be in control of the
firm.
Some aspects of the scheme do not seem plausible at all. For example,
comparison of various bids, and especially combination of partial bids, does
not seem like an easy matter. When noncash or partial-cash bids are
allowed, their assigned valuation will affect the number of shares that each
existing claimant will get, so assigning shares consistent with absolute
priority is problematic. And, tacking on the scheme of Professor
Bebchuk, t4 which allows some claimants to buy out shares of more senior
claimants, is inconsistent with the large set of claimants and complicated
priority structure characteristic of large bankruptcies.
To summarize, bankruptcy may serve purposes outside the short list in
the paper. However, I do not think that there is a mysterious large set of
functions of bankruptcy that cannot be classified and studied. The AHM
paper is one attempt to move towards a more efficient procedure, and it is
a start at moving the debate forward. A better understanding of the
functions of bankruptcy and the underlying economics can only help to
guide us towards better policy.
13. This inability to hold equities may be true of banks or other institutions or investment funds
that must comply with regulations mandating maximum or minimum levels of investment in various
asset classes.
14. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV.
775 (1988).
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